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Authenticated Attribution of Media Content Bound to Devices
ABSTRACT
This disclosure describes techniques to authenticate that a media content item such as a
photograph, a video, etc. is attributed to and originated by a particular user, based on the device
on which the content was created. The content item is created on a device and associated with a
digital signature using an attestation mechanism of the device such as trusted hardware or a
sensor pattern that is unique to the device. The digital signature and content item are provided to
a register or service for access by other users. When an accessing user views the content item,
the content item is verified, via the digital signature, as having originated from the originating
user’s device. The accessing user’s device displays the status of user attribution of the content
item, indicating that the content item originates from a legitimate user and has not been forged,
modified, or stolen. Described techniques are privacy-preserving and do not disclose the identity
of the originating user.
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BACKGROUND
User attribution of media content on the internet is an industry-wide problem. False
attribution of media content to claimed originators represents an attack vector for malicious
activity, e.g., to coerce individuals into particular actions (such as sending money) or represents
lost revenue through the unauthorized reuse of the media content. Unauthorized modified and/or
synthesized media content, such as DeepFakes, are also a rapidly growing problem. Users that
download and display media content do not know, authoritatively, whether the content being
displayed is attributed to a particular entity and has not been forged, stolen, or modified in an
unauthorized manner.
DESCRIPTION
This disclosure describes techniques for authenticating and attributing origination and/or
ownership of media content to users. The described techniques authenticate and attribute media
to a specific device, and passively provides signals to users of media content in a way that lets
them know, authoritatively, that the content being displayed is attributed to a particular entity.
These techniques provide strong independent and external proof that the content item was
generated on a particular device and by a particular user. This allows for attestation of
provenance of that origination or ownership without additional burdens to the user and is
provided via a privacy-preserving manner.
The described authoritative attribution of content provides value to content serving
platforms and the described control mechanisms for content distribution provide value to content
creators ("originating users"). The described techniques are also usable to detect unauthorized
modified and/or synthesized media content such as DeepFakes.
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The described techniques can be implemented on any suitable device or system, e.g.,
desktop or laptop computer, portable user device (e.g., a smartphone), server device(s), etc. The
user is provided with options to enable or disable described techniques. The user can permit
specific data or types of data (e.g., images, videos, etc.) to be processed and can deny processing
of other data or types of data.
Creation of Authenticated Content Items
An example system that provides features described herein is shown in Fig. 1.

Fig. 1: Example system for authoritatively attributing media content to user device
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As shown in Fig. 1, an originating user (101) operates a device (102) to create a media
content item (103), such as an image (e.g., photo), video, or other content item. The device can
be a camera, smartphone, computer, etc. A media fingerprint (104) is generated for the content
item. The media fingerprint is bound to the specific device.
The media fingerprint includes metadata, such as a location of creation, name (e.g.,
username or account, obtained with user permission), camera settings when capturing an image,
etc. The media fingerprint also includes a hash of the content item, and a digital signature based
on the hash of the content item. The hash can be obtained by applying a suitable mathematical
function to the content item and is unique to the media item.
In some cases, the digital signature can be a cryptographic digital signature that provides
assertive provenance to indicate the source of the content item. In some cases, the digital
signature can be provided by using a local attestation mechanism such as a Trusted Platform
Module (TPM) (105), which may be hardware that is on the device and provides security-related
functions using RSA (Rivest-Shamir-Adleman), ECDSA (Elliptic Curve Digital Signature
Algorithm), or other cryptographic techniques. For example, the digital signature can be
determined based on the hash of the content item and a private key stored in the TPM.
In some cases, e.g., if the device does not include a TPM, noise detected by a device
sensor (106) can be used to provide the digital signature, as inferred provenance. For example, an
optical CMOS sensor (complementary metal-oxide-semiconductor sensor) on the device that
captures images may have random noise included in the captured images due to its
manufacturing process. The noise is unique to that CMOS sensor and thus unique to the device.
This noise is inherent in a content item that is a captured image and can be used to identify the
device and as a form of digital signature.
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Disseminating Content Items for Public Access
The content item and media fingerprint (e.g., both included in a content item file) can be
disseminated in any of multiple ways. Referring to Fig. 1, in a first example, the originating user
sends the content item and media fingerprint to a centralized authority that is a trusted
verification service, referred to as a register (108). At the register, the content item is ready for
dissemination across the internet as attested content. The register can be accessed by any
accessing user’s device to download the content item from the register. The privacy of the
originating user is retained since the register does not reveal the identity of the originating user to
devices accessing the register.
In a second example, the originating user uploads their signed content item to an internet
service (109) that provides the content item for access to other users. For example, the service
can be a social media service or other type of service/ website that provides a user account or
other user identity under which the originating user can post content items.
When uploading the content item file to the service, the originating user attests (107) the
device to a vendor, which can be the service or can be a third-party vendor that can provide
verification to the service. In an example attestation process, the originating user attests to the
vendor that he or she owns the device, the vendor sends a barcode or other coded representation
to the originating user, the originating user displays the barcode on a different device, takes a
photo of the bar code with the device, and sends the photo from the device to the vendor, and the
vendor accepts that the originating user owns the device. The service then associates that device
(and the associated digital signature) with the originating user’s account on the service that is
being used by the originating user in the attestation process.
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In some cases, the originating user can choose to maintain his or her privacy in
association with the content item, e.g., hide any association of the user’s identity and account
with the content item when it is provided for access by the service. If this privacy option is
chosen, a privacy cryptographic protocol such as Private Set Membership (PSM) or other privacy
protocol or technique, e.g., zero knowledge proofs such as Succinct Non-Interactive Arguments
of Knowledge (SNARK), Bulletproof, etc. can be used to maintain privacy of the user’s identity.
In an example, the service hashes and stores the device signature and user account identification
in a PSM table (accumulator) that is fully encrypted. When a request for verification is received,
only a hash of the digital signature is received in the request, the hash is looked up in that table,
and the service only informs the requestor whether a matching hash is present or not, without
revealing to the requestor the stored hash or other information in the table.
Access of Content Items by Other Users
Referring again to Fig. 1, a different user (“accessing user”) (111) can access the service
via a device (112) and download the content item for display on the device. For example, the
accessing user can use a browser (113) or other application program that retrieves the content
item file (including content item and media fingerprint) and displays the content item on a
display screen (114), e.g., as an image, icon, etc. The media fingerprint for the content item is
parsed by the browser to verify the attribution of the content item based on instructions (e.g., as
part of the browser or of a browser plugin) that enables the described verification. This parsing
and verification process occurs in the background; the accessing user does not need to provide
input or be aware of the verification process. The browser verifies the content item through a
third-party entity (e.g., register 108, service 109, or manufacturer 110).
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In some cases, if a media fingerprint is provided with the content item and the originating
user sent the content item to a register (108) as described above, the browser attempts to verify
the signature by sending a query to the same register, where the query includes the digital
signature and hash from the media fingerprint. If the register has a matching hash associated with
a matching signature, the register returns an answer to the browser that indicates that the content
item is verified as being attributed to the originating user. If the hash is not present or metadata is
missing in the media fingerprint (and the digital signature is present), then the content item can
be hashed by the accessing user’s device and sent to the register with the signature.
In some cases, e.g., if the content item was not provided to a register by the originating
user, the verification process of the browser can include querying the manufacturer (110) of the
originating user’s device, e.g., over the internet, by sending the content item and its media
signature to the manufacturer. The manufacturer can verify that the content item originated from
(e.g., was created on) a particular device that has the device signature associated with the content
item. For example, the manufacturer can verify, based on its data records, that the digital
signature originated from a device having a particular public key from a TPM on that device, or
from a device having a particular noise pattern from the CMOS sensor. The manufacturer
provides a reply to the browser that indicates whether the content item is verified, e.g., whether
or not the digital signature originated on the originating user’s device.
In some cases, the query for verification can be sent by the browser to the service (109)
providing access to the content item. The browser can send the media fingerprint of the content
item to the service. If the service has previously verified the content item, such as via the
attestation of the originating user to the service as described above, the service replies that the
content item is verified for the originating user.
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If the originating user requested privacy as described above, then the browser sends only
the digital signature to the service in the request for verification, with no metadata. In this way,
neither the verifying entity nor the accessing user get to know anything about the originating
user’s identity. When the signature associated with the content item is verified as described
above, the service associates the content item with an identity (e.g., user account) of the
originating user. If a media fingerprint is not provided with the content item, the browser can
indicate to the accessing user that the content item is not verified and that it does not have an
attributable originating user.
The browser displays the status of the verification, without requiring input from the user.
A content item is displayed in the browser (or other application program) with a visual indicator,
e.g., a visual overlay, that indicates the verified origination of the content item and whether the
content item is authentic, e.g., has not been reattributed or modified since that origination. For
example, a verified content item (115) is displayed with a visual indicator (116) that indicates
that the originating user originated the content item. In an example, if permitted by the
originating user, the originating user’s account name can be displayed in or associated with the
visual indicator.
If the originating user requested privacy in association with the content item, the visual
indicator can indicate that the content item originates with an (unnamed) user and has not been
modified since that origination. For example, the source of verification can be indicated by the
visual indicator, e.g., the register or service that verified the origination of the content item. The
user’s identity (e.g., account) is not displayed in association with the content item.
In an example, the accessing user accesses the originating user’s photo website that
displays images of the user’s photos. A visual indicator is displayed with each image and
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indicates that the originating user originated these photos and that they have not been modified
or stolen.
If the content item signature is not verified, or a digital signature is not provided with the
content item, the content item (117) is displayed with a visual indicator (118) that indicates that
there is no verified user attribution or origination for the content item.
Users are provided with options to grant permissions to and/or to disable described
features entirely. The various features of the system are implemented only with user permission
to access user information that serves as input to the system (e.g., user images or other content
items, user context information, camera input, user’s preferences, etc.). Users may be provided
with controls allowing the user to make an election as to both if and when systems, programs or
features described herein may enable collection of user information, and if the user is sent
content or communications from a server. Certain techniques are not implemented if users deny
permission. In addition, certain data may be treated in one or more ways before it is stored or
used, so that personally identifiable information is removed. For example, a user’s identity may
be treated so that no personally identifiable information can be determined for the user. Thus, the
user may have control over what information is collected about the user, how that information is
used, and what information is provided to the user.
CONCLUSION
This disclosure describes techniques to authenticate that a media content item such as a
photograph, a video, etc. is attributed to and originated by a particular user, based on the device
on which the content was created. The content item is created on a device and associated with a
digital signature using an attestation mechanism of the device such as trusted hardware or a
sensor pattern that is unique to the device. The digital signature and content item are provided to
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a register or service for access by other users. When an accessing user views the content item,
the content item is verified, via the digital signature, as having originated from the originating
user’s device. The accessing user’s device displays the status of user attribution of the content
item, indicating that the content item originates from a legitimate user and has not been forged,
modified, or stolen. Described techniques are privacy-preserving and do not disclose the identity
of the originating user.
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